PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW: AN
ATTEMPT AT SYNTHESIS*
RAYMOND L.

ERICKSONj

HAT THERE EXIST certain basic conflicts between current
understanding of the psychodynamics of human behavior and some
of the assumptions underlying jurisprudence is a truism, but it sometimes
requires a personal experience with a particular case to bring the contradictions into sharp focus. Some time ago, the writer, while functioning
as a psychological intern in a state prison system, encountered a situation
in which some of the conflicts were dearly manifested.
A relatively new inmate had expressed a desire to be considered
for parole at a tire that was somewhat premature for much hope of
success, and during an interview, he presented the following account.
He had been charged with a sexual offense involving children, of
which he was guilty, and had been committed to a mental institution for
examination under the state's sex psychopath law rather than sentenced
for his crime. He was found to be a sexual psychopath, and after the
initial ninety-day observation, he was recommitted on an indeterminate
commitment. He spent a total of eighteen months at the state hospital,
undergoing psychotherapy for most of that period. When the staff
felt that he could not profit from further care and treatment at the
hospital, he was sent back to the court for consideration of the criminal
charge that had been made against him, as was mandatory in such situations. He brought with him a recommendation from the superintendent 'of the hospital that stated precisely that he had received
maximum benefit from psychotherapy and was "no longer a menace
to the health and safety of others." The superintendent further recommended that the ex-patient be given probation and continued psychiatric
treatment after his release.
The following is a direct quotation (from the court record) of part
of the presiding judge's statement:
* The research necessary for this article was made possible by a grant from the John
Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation.
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We have a situation here somewhat analogous to a person who commits a
crime suffering from some pathology, the pathology is cured, but that doesn't
entitle him to be relieved from the penalties. In other words, this is not
merely a question as to whether a person has adopted a different attitude
towards the crime he has committed. If he has committed a crime sufficiently
serious to come within the principles of penology, he comes within those
principles, even though he has changed his attitude. You might have a
chronic thief who suddenly has gotten religion after he has committed a series
of serious offenses, but because he has gotten religion, is not going to steal
anymore, is no reason why the penalty should be removed. We have here
a particularly aggravated case. There was a degree of preparation for commission of these offenses, in other words, an anticipation of committing offenses
of this kind, the fellow so prepared his pocket he didn't have any bottom to it,
and so forth....
I have got to consider more than the mere matter of reformation. The
administrationof criminal law is not solely intended to reform the individual,
and if the individual is reformed by the time he gets into court-I think we
have to take a case of this sort where a person with his eyes open has committed serious violations of the law; -I can't conscientiously grant probation.... (Emphasis added.)
The judge then proceeded to sentence the ex-patient to an indeterminate sentence of one year to life in the state penitentiary.
His decision, an outstanding example of the retributive function of
justice, brings to the fore the inevitable conflict ensuing whenever there
is no unifying, consistent philosophy underlying the functioning of a
social institution. Such an absence of unifying principles is a salient
characteristic of the administration of justice not only in the state in
question, but throughout the United States.' Here and there can be
found parts of the whole that are based upon a positivist theory of

justice, but coexisting with them are other aspects of the total system
that are definitely classical and punitive in nature. The sex psychopath
laws, with all of their very real shortcomings, are at least an attempt to
deal with the problem of crime in a positivist manner. But when they
must be administered within the framework of a juridical system that
remains basically punitive in its orientation, logical contradictions are
the inevitable result. Our system of jurisprudence is neither fish nor
,Regarding this particular conflict, Indiana, New Hampshire, and Michigan have
provided that commitment as a sexual psychopath disposes of the criminal charge. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-3409 (1956) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173:13 (1955) ; MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 780.508 (1948).
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fowl; "[we] attempt to serve a confusion of all possible ends of criminal justice by a confusion of all possible methods."'
If one were to investigate the differences of opinion regarding the
proper end that the criminal law is to serve, it would be found that
most could be related to the difference between two basic theoretical
orientations. One approach, based upon Kant's philosophy, holds that
the criminal law should mete out punishment as retribution for crime.
According to this theory, justice is concerned with the "rightness" of
the individual; if he behaves "badly," he has earned punishment or
retribution, and the actual effect that this retribution has upon him is of
only secondary consideration. The other basic interpretation of the
proper end of criminal law is that it ought to serve the welfare of the
state by preventing crime. The means used to accomplish this, according to the utilitarian theory, are of secondary importance. They may
or may not involve punishment; but if they do, the punishment is
justified only if, according to Bentham, "it prevents some greater evil,"
or in other words, contributes to the end of preventing crime, protecting
society, and enhancing the welfare of the state. Psychiatrists, in their
voluminous criticisms of the law, tend to accept the utilitarian theory
as representing the proper end of criminal justice, while a significant percentage of the members of the judiciary tend to emphasize the end of
retribution. It is to be the major purpose of this paper to demonstrate
that these two ends are not mutually exclusive, and, more explicitly, that
the goal of the utilitarian theory cannot be adequately realized unless
proper recognition is given to the end set forth in the retributive theory.
The lack of agreement between members of the two professions of
psychiatry3 and the law as to what constitutes the proper end of criminal
'Gausewitz,

Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, Part II, ix Wis. L. REV.

346, 542 (.936).

'Psychiatry," unless otherwise stipulated, will be taken here to involve psychology,

"the science of human behavior and experience," and to mean roughly, a scientific view
of man. This obviously includes social aspects, and is by no means a "purely medical"
approach. The historical fact that psychiatry developed within the framework of the
medical profession seems to lead many writers to the erroneous assumption that
psychiatry is "biological" and that the psychiatrist is no more competent to deal meaningfully with social factors than an opthalmologist. It should also be made clear that
when we speak of "psychiatry," we are referring to a group that is in the vanguard
of a movement to reform our traditional punitive system for dealing with criminals,
a movement that has already accomplished much. Not all persons who advance the

views herein ascribed to psychiatry are psychiatrists; likewise, not all psychiatrists adhere
to these views. The latter point causes some to question the degree to which psychiatry
is "scientific," while it should lead them to question the advisability of generalizing
beyond bne's area of competence.
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justice is at least in part a result of the differing concepts of the nature
of man which are held. Simply put, the major difference is that members of the legal profession tend to picture man as a free moral agent
with the capacity to choose between right and wrong acts, while most
psychiatrists, by remaining true to the scientific picture of man that
has been evolved during the last seventy years, conceive of man's
behavior as completely subject to the influence of antecedent determining factors. 4 They would, of course, admit that man has a conscious experience which he calls "making a choice"; but the choice that
he will make has already been determined 5 by antecedent circumstances,
and his conscious experience of making a choice is merely his subjective awareness of the means whereby the influences of previous experiences and other antecedent conditions are synthesized. Man may
feel that he has complete control over this synthesis of factors when
making a "decision," but in actuality, he has not, for his subjective
experience of control often does not include an awareness of many of
the most important factors involved in the synthesis. In other words,
unconscious motivation influences a great many of our decisions in a
major way, and is probably involved to some extent in all of them.
It is hardly necessary to point out that these two concepts of the
nature of man are incompatible. The law is based upon the assumption
that free will exists. It allows for certain exceptions-for example,
insane and other mentally diseased persons-but other than these exceptions, wrongdoers are held responsible for their acts because it is assumed
that they have the ability to do right if they so desire. Most psychiatrists
would maintain that this is 'not so, for acts are predetermined 'and the
concept of "responsibility" is not scientifically meaningful.0 From this
(and here is where the ranks of psychiatry begin to diverge more),
some conclude that the use of punishment is both illogical and fruitless,
either as a means of individual treatment or as a means of general
deterrence, and that the only meaningful approach to criminality lies
in the use of psychotherapy, which will bring about a change in the
'Many psychiatrists would perhaps deny ascribing to such an extreme position; but
in spite of the philosophically erudite proclamations to the contrary made by some
to make their position more palatable to others and perhaps to themselves, most
psychiatrists are deterministic in their approach..
'Which does not mean that it was foreordained (i.e., determined before the occurrence of the antecedent set of circumstances), a frequent source of confusion, for some
obscure reason.

' Note that this is not the same as saying that it is not a useful, or perhaps even
necessary, concept.
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(usually unconscious) factors that have influenced the person in such a
way that he has committed a crime.
When one considers the extreme disparity between the "deterministic" and "free will" interpretations of man's behavior, it becomes somewhat puzzling that there has been any rapproachement whatsoever
7
between psychiatry and the law. As one writer says :
. ..we discover what we should have known all along-that genuine scientific "causal" theories render the assignment of moral "blame" to persons
unnecessary and, in fact, impossible. If we take physics and its various
branches seriously, we conclude, as indeed most people in our society have
concluded, that we cannot blame the gods if our crops fail or if our cattle
die. Similarly, if we would take psychology and its branches seriously, as
very few people seem prepared to do, we might conclude that we cannot
blame men for what they do. They, too, have their "reasons," but, to "understand" does not necessarily mean that one must "forgive."
The explanation for the degree of rapport that exists would seem to
be that only a few psychiatrists really take psychology and its branches
seriously as far as their practical relations in everyday life and the functioning of the criminal law are concerned. Even such extreme advocates
of the "psychiatric position" as Franz Alexander and Gregory Zilboorg
would probably hesitate to say that there is no advantage whatever in
holding anyone morally responsible for anything. The majority of
forensic psychiatrists, regardless of what they might proclaim as their
theoretical position on the question of determinism, have behaved in
their relationships with the law as if they considered the "normal" individual to be morally responsible and, therefore, accountable for his
acts. Their major contention with the law has not been over whether
or not it is possible to attach moral responsibility to anyone at all,
but over the criteria to be used in determining who should be held
responsible for his acts and who should not. In fact, some are quite
insistent upon the riecessity for side-stepping the.whole issue and thereby
ignore the fact that regardless of what they say, the functioning of
psychiatry is based upon the assumption of determinism.
Bromberg and Cleckley ask:'
Is it possible for us to avoid attempts to settle the controversy over free-will
and determinism (or fore-ordination) (sic.) and still give an honest medical
SSzasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Lau, 5S COLUM. L. REV. 183, 192

(958).
'Bromberg & Cleckley, The Medico-legal Dilemma--A Suggested Solution,
J. C.m. L., C. & P.S. 729, 738-739 (195z).

42
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opinion about the questions we are asked in court? ... Refusing all temptations to assume the role of arbiter in questions of man's moral obligations,
(or whether or not any such obligations exist), GrassetP confines himself
to difficult enough but medically approachable problems. He attempts a
judgment, on whether or not the capability of the organism is impaired ....
As employed by Grasset long ago, it is the (medical) expert's job to give
an opinion on whether or not the particular subject is damaged or deranged
to such a degree that he cannot be counted on to show ordinary functional
capacity. If we attempt to include in our opinion the ultimate solution
of the free-will versus determinism argument, our opinion is not likely to
be of practical value. Who can say that philosophical determinism has any
better claims to final proof than free-will?
These same writers make several specific suggestions for a solution
to the medico-legal dilemma, among them the following:' 0
That psychiatrists avoid the ultimate problem of free-will and determination
in their medical judgments, since the issue of mental disease and crime can
be met adequately short of the ultimate philosophic and religious questions
involved. To implement this orientation it is recommended that the concept
of "accountability" be substituted for that of "responsibility" in the legal test
for criminal responsibility. This would mean that the question given the
expert witness would be in language approximately as follows: "In your
opinion, was the defendant suffering from disease of the mind and if so, was
it sufficient to render him unaccountable under the law for the crime
charged?"
The basic problem, as perceived by these authors along with many
others, is to give the psychiatrist an opportunity to testify in a meaningful
fashion regarding the "accountability" (or responsibility) of the accused.
' Joseph Grasset was Professor of Clinical Medicine at the University of Montpellier,
and in 1907 wrote a book called Demifotts et Demiresponsables [The Semi-Insane
and the Semi-Responsible]. In this work, he attempted to delineate three levels of
responsibility for behavior (sane, insane, and semi-insane) in terms of the relationships
among neurological mechanisms in the central nervous system. To the extent that the
"superior psychic center" was intact and functioning, free-will was assumed to be
operating and the person could behave in a voluntary, responsible manner. If the
functional neural connections between' the "superior psychism" and the lower "inferior
psychism" were impaired or eliminated, the person was semi-insane or insane, respectively. Grasset thus considered the problem of semiresponsibility to be strictly a
medical problem, since it was thought to be based upon a neurological condition. Needless to say, his concepts of "superior and inferior psychic centers" residing in specific
groups of neurons and related directly to specific aspects of personality function, such as
the exercise of free will, are not substantiated by present-day neurology or personality
theory. (Author's footnote.)
'0 Id. at 747-4P.
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Some persons are in such a mental state that they should not be held
accountable, regardless of whether or not they (or anyone else) are
"really responsible" in an ultimate philosophical sense. Of course, what
is being protested by ese critics who wish to give the psychiatristwitness greater opportunities for offering meaningful testimony is the
law's tenacious adherence to the antiquated criteria for determining legal
insanity (and hence irresponsibility for crime) laid down in the
M'Naghten Rules. Undoubtedly, more has been written about the
M'Naghien Rules than about any other single topic relevant to the
relationship between psychiatry and the law. They were attacked by
some from their very inception on essentially the same grounds that
they are attacked today, and they are still being defended as the best
possible guide to determining criminal irresponsibility. It is unnecessary to present a thoroughgoing analysis of the M'Naghten Rules here,
but a consideration of their major characteristics is in order.
The M'Naghten Rules were formulated in England in 1843, following an attempt on the life of Prime Minister Robert Peel by one
Daniel M'Naghten. Although there are several aspects to them, the
essential criteria for determining legal insanity which they lay down
are as follows:11
...to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, itmust be clearly proved
that at the time of committing the act the accused was laboring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
that he did not know he
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it,
was doing what was wrong.
Even without considering the numerous difficulties that arise as soon
as one attempts to apply this rule-for example, defining the meaning
of the words "know," "nature," "quality," and "wrong"-one is impressed by the fact that there is but little relationship between the criteria
for insanity that it sets forth and the criteria for mental illness which
are utilized by contemporary psychiatrists. It is quite possible for a
psychotic suffering from severe delusions and hallucinations to "pass
the test," and, in fact, it has frequently happened that persons whom
any competent psychiatrist would adjudge psychotic have been found
to be "legally sane."' Psychiatrists, at least a good many of them, have
been agitating for years to get the rules changed so that they could,
in court, make more meaningful statements about the psychological state
of the accused person. Urider the M'Naghten Rules, they are forced
11

M'Naghten's Case, io Cl. & Fin. 2oo, zio, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,

7Z2

(1843).
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to attempt a description of the accused's mental state in terms of such
criteria as "knowing the difference between right and wrong," or "knowing the quality of the act," concepts that have no meaning whatever to
12
most psychiatrists, and that have only doubtful significance to lawyers,
although the latter usually insist that they are meaningful, if only the
psychiatrists would stop "resisting." In a consideration of this problem,
3
Gregory Zilboorg has a hypothetical psychiatrist say:1
When they all individually and jointly [judges, lawyers, and jury], ask
me whether the defendant in the dock is in my opinion insane, I must candidly
state, if I am to remain true to my professional knowledge and faithful to my
oath, first, that I do not understand the question, and second, that since
I don't understand the question, I do not know whether the defendant is
insane or not. I admit the situation is embarrassing and puzzling to all
concerned, but it is beyond my knowledge and power to remedy or alleviate
it.... We have reached a rather disquieting parting of the ways. This is
undesirable from both yoti"- [the jurist's] point of view and mine. Your
rules are unintelligible to me, and my inability to follow them is unintelligible
to you.
The basic complaint of the psychiatrists is that the law, in utilizing
the M'Naghten Rules, imposes upon man an abstract and artificial conceptualization of his mental functioning and its relationship to behavior.
If a psychiatrist is to be "true to his professional knowledge and faithful to his oath," he cannot accept this distortion of reality, and must
protest. The argument used by the defenders of the M'Naghten Rules
which points out that the law does not presume to define insanity, but
only to establish absence of criminal responsibility, offers the psychiatrist
little satisfaction; for when he considers that the manner in which
irresponsibility is established usually involves obtaining expert testimony
from someone regarding the mental state of the accused, he cannot help
but feel that he should be able to give such testimony without abandoning his professional knowledge.
The strong criticisms made of the MNaghten Rules have led to
12

The different interpretations given to the various parts of the formula are in-

dicative that it is by no means as simple and straight-forward, even to lawyers, as
they like to imagine. For instance, some states interpret the word "wrong" to mean
"morally wrong," while others take it to mean "against the lawl" a difference in
meaning that is of no little importance when attempting to determine whether or not
a person "knew his act was 'wrong.'
2*

ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN Z72,

274

(1943).
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numerous variations in the way in which they are utilized, but in con14
sidering their present status in the United States, we can still say that :
In all jurisdictions, except the District of Columbia and New Hampshire,
the McNaghten Rules have been adopted and are still followed, though a
a number of States have introduced modifications and qualifications of them.
The most common modification has been the addition of the "capacity to conform" aspect (more commonly and less desirably called
the "irresistible impulse" test). This additional criterion makes it
possible for a person to be declared criminally irresponsible if it can be
satisfactorily. demonstrated that even though he may have known the
nature and quality of his act and known that it was wrong, he was unable, through any act of volition, to behave other than he did."5 It
is difficult to generalize, since there is so much variation both in the
strictness of the interpretation put on the M'Naghten Rules by different
judges in charging their juries, and in the willingness of juries to adhere
to a particular interpretation, but it appears that the right-and-wrong
test, as the M'Naghen Rules are sometimes called, is the sole test of
responsibility in approximately thirty of our states, while it is the primary test, supplemented only by the "capacity to conform" test in all
the remaining jurisdictions except the District of Columbia and New
Hampshire.
New Hampshire has enjoyed the distinction of having had, since
1869, a rule essentially the same as that which created such interest
when, in i954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overthrew the MNaghten Rules, stating:10
The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in future
cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870.
It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect....
The implications of this brief statement require some thought in
order that their full significance be realized. It has been hailed as a
godsend by those who have long advocated a more realistic evaluation
of criminal responsibility, and condemned as an opening wedge in the
eventual breakdown of criminal law by some of the more traditionallyminded. It has produced a flurry of publications pro and con, and in
spite of the oft-indicated fact that a similar rule has been in operation
"4Donnelly,Establishment of Criminal Responsibility, 33 CONN. B.J. 137 (1959).

"5Astate of affairs which, if we take psychology "seriously," applies to all behavior.
"8 Durham v. United States, 214 F.zd 86z (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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in New Hampshire since 1869, its inception has resulted in some new
and serious thinking about the existing rules governing legal insanity.
The major theoretical change brought about by the Durham Rule
(or the "product rule," as it is sometimes called) is that the problem of
insanity is changed from a matter of law to a matter of fact. The perhaps more important practical difference is that under it, the expert
medical witness can testify about the mental condition of the accused
without being forced to describe that condition in terms of mental states
that have existence only in the conceptual schemes of lawyers. This
basic change is the reason why the Durham Rule has been described
by some psychiatrists as a revolutionary forward step.
The fear that is expressed in most of the objections 1 raised to the
Durham Rule is that it leaves things "wide open"--that it makes it
much too easy for an accused person to be found criminally irresponsible,
and that the efficacy of the law is thereby reduced. This basic reaction
is expressed in various ways, including the fear that "due process" is
being violated by allowing psychiatrists actually to decide who is mentally ill and who is not,' and consternation that anybody who has committed a crime may be pronounced not responsible,' provided that the
terms "product" and "mental disease" are given liberal enough interpretations. The latter fear has a specific manifestation in the apprehension
felt*by many that the so-called psychopath,2 that perplexing and
ubiquitous character so common among criminals, will be found to be
irresponsible under the Durham Rule. The now-famous Leach case,
in which an armed robber was diagnosed by seven psychiatrists as a
"sociopathic personality with dyssocial outlook" (a more up-to-date and
complicated term for .psychopath) and adjudged under the Durham
Rule to be "not guilty by reason of insanity," demonstrated that this
fear is not without grounds. Leach was sent to St. Elizabeth's Hospital and within a few months petitioned for his release on a habeas
corpus, claiming that he was of sound mind and therefore could not be
held. The District Court ordered him released, but the Circuit Court
" See Cavanagh, The Responsibility of the Mentallyll for Criminal Offenses, 4
CATHOLIC LAW. 317, 368 (1958); Davidson, Criminal Responsibility: The Quest for
a Formula, in HOCH & ZUBIN (eds.), PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 61 (1955); Wertham, Psychoauthoritaritnism and the Law, 2z U. CHI. L. REv. 336 (1955).
18 Cavanagh, supra note 17, at 320.
11 Davidson, supra note 17, at 63.
The psychopath is not psychotic and usually not even neurotic, but is considered
by many psychiatrists to be mentally ill. See CLECKLY, THE MASK OF SANTY (1950).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. i96i: 30

reversed the decision 21 and ordered him retained at the mental institution, on the grounds that persons who have been found "not guilty by
reason of insanity" are in a different category than persons who may
have similar mental conditions, but have committed no crime. The
former, according to the court, must meet more stringent criteria to
obtain release once they are committed.2
It must be granted that this is a rather puzzling situation. A man
whose mental state is such that he would be released had he not committed a crime is being held in a mental institution, probably indefinitely
(since there is little hope for any change in his condition), and the state
was forced to this action because otherwise it would have been necessary
to release completely within a few months a man who had committed a
serious crime. It is not surprising that many view the "step forward"
made by the Durham Rule with some alarm and wonder what, exactly,
lies ahead in the "forward" direction. To quote two lawyers who have
had first-hand experience with some of the problems that have developed
under the Durham Rule:
The Durham Rule has now had four and one-half years to prove itself
workable, and has brought only chaotic uncertainty to lawyers, judges, and
jurors.

23

The new rule is vague and lacking in criteria understandable by an average
jury, and difficult to apply. If the ultimate objective is a non-punitive system
with mental hospitals and psychiatrists substituted for prisons and penologists,
24
it is properly a problem for Congress, both legally and in a budgetary sense.
1 It would seem that in spite
of the fact that it is considered to be a
more rational, realistic, and scientifically respectable method of determining criminal responsibility than the M'Naghten Rules ever were,
the Durham Rule has been no outstanding success as an improvement in
our system of justice. The fears of the critics that it would allow "anyone" to be found "not guilty by reason of insanity" seem to have been
shown to have considerable foundation by a situation in which a man
found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be legitimately retained in
" See Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"'Foran Interesting discussion of some of the complications ensuing from the Leach
case, see Gasch, Prosecution Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 5
(959).
"'McGee, Defense Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 35, 43
('959).
54
Gasch, supra note 27, at 81.
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a mental institution until a ruling has been passed which, in effect, makes
a special case of him and others in his category. It might seem difficult
to continue to maintain that the Durham Rule really is a more rational,
realistic, and scientifically respectable method of determining criminal
responsibility. However, it is the contention of the writer that it is
precisely because the new rule is all of these things that it cannot
possibly work to improve our system of criminal law, for in order-for
the law to be effective, it must ignore certain aspects of reality, not the
least among which is the reality of determinism in human behavior.
What is it that has really taken place, then, with the utilization of
the Durham Rule? The essential point is that psychiatrists have been
enabled to bring reality into the process of ascribing criminal responsibility-the law has been forced to "take psychology a little more seriously.'y Of course Leach was not criminally responsible! Neither is
any other "sociopathic personality with dyssocial outlook," nor any
exhibitionist suffering from a neurotic character disorder, nor, if you
will, any human being who commits a crime! Not, that is, if you accept
a scientific interpretation of human behavior. The real question to be
asked then, is not who is responsible, for that is all too obvious, but who
should be held responsible. The answer to the latter question is an
answer that cannot be arrived at "scientifically," but can only be obtained
through a careful evaluation of the ends of criminal justice, and an
equally careful determination of the means that are requisite to obtaining these desired ends. Before taking up these major considerations,
let us, in support of the contention that an effective system of jurisprudence does not necessarily depend upon a rejection of the "false"
and a whole-hearted acceptance of that which is "true," offer the following observations made by members of the legal profession. Mr. Justice
Holmes once wrote to Harold Laski:s2
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged
(or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for
you but to make itmore avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to
the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your
country if you like. But the law must keep its promises.
For the common good, Holmes was willing to assume and act as
though the man were responsible, even though he knew that his act was
inevitable for him.
21

HOLMES-LASKI LErrEas 8o6 (Howe ed. 1953).
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Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice Holmes is not alone in his "cynicism."
Jackson expressed a similar if perhaps slightly less disturbing attitude
when he said:6
How far one by an exercise of free will may determine his general destiny
or his course in a particular matter and how far he is the toy of circumstance
has been debated through the ages by theologians, philosophers, and scientists.
Whatever doubts they have entertained as to the matter, the practical business
of government and administration of the law is obliged to proceed on more or
less rough and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature and
rational persons are in control of their own conduct.
In other words, while it may be quite possible that there is no such
thing as free will, it is absolutely necessary for us to assume that free
will exists in order for government and the law to function effectively.
It remains, however, for Thurman Arnold to clarify more definitively the proper relationship between science and jurisprudence, at least as
he perceives it. To quote Warren P. Hill:T
Arnold did not believe that greater knowledge of social and psychological
reality by the mass of the governed would necessarily lead to a better world.
On the contrary, social stability depends on the preservation of man's
ignorance and false view of himself-his capacity to ignore the unconscious
and unacknowledged parts of his personality, which play an unrecognized role
in his actions.
His basic ideas might be expressed thus: Our behavior as social and
political animals is actually determined largely by irrational impulses which,
though they enable us to satisfy physiological needs, do not satisfy our compelling desire to make a rational and moral order out of a chaotic world.
Our self-esteem prevents us from accepting the truth that our psychological
endowment precludes free and deliberate choice between good and evil.
Hence we build elaborate structures of rationalization that we call legal and
Of
economic thinking. These structures are our ideals, our "folklore."
course, the "creeds" of our various institutions are not considered by their
members as mythology, but, on the contrary, as "sound thinking," as truth,
as natural law, as a body of inevitable principles. Because there is no correspondence between the ideal constructions we project and the actual practices
that go on in the world, we create legal rituals and popular symbols which
keep us unconscious of the discrepancy between illusion and reality, and
facilitate a rough adjustment to an imperfect world. And while these
"'See Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1942).
'Hill, The Psychological Realism of Thurman Arnold, 22 U. Cmi. L. REV. 377,
379 (955).
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"little pictures" of the world, in the form of ideas and ideals-neat, tidy,
trim, but simply not true--which we interpose between ourselves and the real
world often hinder the solution of practical human problems (like feeding the
unemployed during a depression), we need them for our morale and consolation, and our institutions would lose vitality without them. Any event which
28
disturbs the people's belief in a "logical heaven where Reason is enthroned"
must be attributed by them to some "devil" such as "politics" or "human
nature." The union of law and the social sciences is impossible because it
would tend to undermine popular faith in legal order and certainty. The
"Law" cannot be made scientific but to remain effective must only keep
abreast of popular attitudes . . . . Such ideas pervade Arnold's view of the
function of criminal courts and the "creed" of law enforcement. Trials,
both criminal and civil, are purely ceremonial in function and are hardly
a sensible manner of settling disputes. The true function of courts is not
fact-finding but the dramatization of the ideals behind government.
And finally, from Arnold himself :'o
Functionally the primary purpose of the science of the law is to be a
sounding board of both the prevalent hopes and the prevalent worries of
those who believe in a government of law and not of men, to reconcile these
hopes and worries somewhere in the mists of scholarship and learning, and
never to admit that this is what it is doing ....
However, as we will attempt
to show later, the pragmatic utility of a purely objective point of view is very
limited. It is useful for the purpose of finding out how institutions work.
It may form the basis of a technique of therapeutics. But to expect that it
will take the place of faiths and ceremonies, even for those who on occasion
may avail themselves of it, is to misunderstand the way of man in society.
A realistic appraisal of the nature of man 'nd his relationship to
his society necessitates accepting that in order for man to live in a relatively harmonious state, it is mandatory that he entertain certain beliefs
about himself and his institutions that are not scientifically demonstrable.
A more effective system of criminal law cannot be based upon a philosophy that ignores this, nor can it ignore the fact that one of its major
functions is the control of the noncriminal majority in the population. If the sole function of the criminal law were the future deterrence
of individuals who have already committed criminal acts and have
fallen into the hands of the law, the difficulties involved in prescribing
the optimum methods to be utilized would be greatly reduced. Such,
"Arnold, Apologia for Jurisprudence,44
" Id. at 729, 753.

YALE

LJ. 729, 730 (935).
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unfortunately, is not the case. Even if it is agreed that the proper end
of the criminal law is the utilitarian function of preventing crime, it
would appear that one of the factors necessary for accomplishing this
is the ascription of personal moral responsibility for our actions, involving the threat of punishment for each and every one of us should
we behave in an unacceptable way.
In order to make this clear, it is necessary at this point to offer and
support three propositions. The first is that anticipated punishment is
effective as a deterrent; the second is the above-mentioned point that
an effective criminal law can not be concerned solely with the "criminal"i and the third is that, while it may be true that there is no such
thing as free will and all behavior is determined by antecedent conditions, the fact that society holds an individual responsible for his actions
can influence him toward desirable behavior.
Relevant to the first point, it must be indicated that there seems to
exist today an extremely widespread misconception to the effect that
psychologists have demonstrated that punishment is utterly ineffective
as a means of preventing undesired behavior; and since it is also very
apt to produce aggression, hostility, or some other undesirable emotional
state in the organism that is punished, it should never be used as a
means of controlling behavior. Critics of our punitive system of
criminal law are quick to point out that there is support for this contention in the fact that even though we punish criminals severely, they
continue to commit crimes. An example that is frequently cited is that
of pickpockets practicing their craft in the crowds that gathered to
watch the hanging of apprehended pickpockets in early nineteenthcentury England. How valid are these arguments? The truth of the
matter is that no psychologist has ever shown that punishment is
absolutely ineffective as a means of controlling behavior. What has
been demonstrated is that punishment is usually less effective and
contributes less to the well-being of the organism than other means
of control that involve positive reinforcement, so that positive reinforcement is preferable whenever it is possible to implement it. But this
is not to say that punishment is without effect; and, it should be noted,
neither is it to say that punishment may not sometimes be preferable
as a means of control, even when other more "positive" means are
available, since the utilization of these other nonpunitive means may
involve prohibitive costs or carry with it other undesirable concom-

Vol. ig6i: 3 o]

PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

45

mitants. It is only when the optimum immediate well-being of the
individual is our primary concern that we are justified in maintaining
that we should never use punishment when some nonpunitive means.
can be implemented.
The argument that severe punishment contributes absolutely nothing
to the prevention of crimes is fallacious. Variables of crucial importance
that are usually overlooked in arguments supporting this proposition
are the degree of certainty of apprehension and the strength of the need
that is served by the criminal act in each case. If a man is relatively
certain that he will not be caught, no threatened punishment, regardless
of its severity, will be apt to have much deterring effect by itself.
Similarly, if a person is very strongly motivated to commit a crime, the
deterring effect of a given punishment will be much smaller. A father
with hungry children is not as apt to be affected by the punishment that
accompanies stealing a loaf of bread as is a father whose children are
well fed. The fact that extremely strong motivation may significantly
reduce the deterring effect of an anticipated punishment is, of course,
one of the reasons why many individuals have committed murder or sex
crimes, regardless of the severity of the punishment that they knew
awaited them if they were caught. Obviously, the anticipated punishment did not deter them; but there is a great error involved in assuming
that because it did not deter these particular individuals, anticipation of
severe punishment had no influence at all on human conduct in that
particular social group. For every rapist whose particular constellation
of personality characteristics is such that he is strongly enough motivated
to attack a woman in spite of the extreme punishment attached to the
crime, there may be hundreds of individuals who have similar psychological needs, but whose motivations are not intense enough to negate
the effect of the anticipated punishment.
It is ridiculous, then, to assume that because some individuals commit crimes in spite of the threat of strong punitive action against them,
punishment does nothing to deter crime. Those who agitate for the
abolition of punishment of criminal offenders frequently are on- very
shaky ground, for while they can present ample evidence that a great
deal of crime has been committed in situations where a punitive approach
has been taken toward its control, they cannot produce any evidence
whatsoever that bears on the question of what the crime rate would have
been had a nonpunitive approach been taken under the same economic
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and social circumstances. Only half the requirements of Mill's Method
of Difference for establishing causality have been fulfilled, which
seems hardly adequate to permit the generalizations that are often made.
Another variable that is often considered to be relevant to the
effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent is the degree to which the
crime in question is a result of rational calculation rather than an emotionally-based, impulsive act. The point is frequently made that while
kidnaping, a calculated type of crime, may have been virtually eliminated
by making it a capital offense, capital punishment for murder has little
deterring effect,, since the majority of murders are committed by persons who are in an emotionally-aroused state in which rational calculation of consequences is at a- minimum. Even allowing for the relevance of other factors in this instance (such as the increased probability of
detection by the FBI once kidnaping was made a federal offense), it
does seem reasonable to assume that anticipated punishment is apt to
produce a maximum of deterring effect on acts that involve a maximum
of rational calculation, and a lesser effect on acts that are more impulsive
in nature. However, it is again an error to assume that because kidnaping
has almost disappeared and murder is still relatively common, severe
pfulishment for murder does little, if anything, to deter persons from"
committing murder.8 0 Before such an inference could be drawn, it
would be necessary to have some evidence that circumstances exerting
pressures toward kidnaping and murder are somewhere near equally
common in our society. This seems hardly a reasonable assumption,
and there certainly is no evidence for it. To make the point in a slightly
different way, before we could say that anticipgtion of strong punishment
has little, if any inhibiting effect on the commission of those crimes that
are essentially a result of violent emotional arousal, we would need
evidence bearing on their frequency in social atmospheres exhibiting
socioeconomic and ideological characteristics similar to those of our
own society, but in which no severe punishment of any kind is attached
to such crimes. Meaningful evidence of this nature is nonexistent.
"0Statistics demonstrating that states that retain capital punishment have as high
an incidence of murder as those that have abolished it prove very little about the
effectiveness of severe punishment as a deterrent. For one thing, other variables, such
as the relative certainty of conviction are not controlled; and for another, it is not at

all clear whether death is universally perceived as much more punishing than life imprisonment. The inability to accept emotionally the possibility of death actually
occurring to one's self until it is immediately imminent may actually detract from the
efficacy of the death sentence as a severe punishment.
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It seems psychologically naive to assume that anticipated punishment
can only be effective as a deterrent if the individual in question is
cosciously aware of the consequences at the crucial moment of committing or not committing his act. It implies that our decisions are
influenced only by those factors that enter into the conscious experience
of decision-making, an implication that is strongly refuted by some of
the basic tenets of dynamic psychology. It is a strange paradox that
some of the most active exponents of a dynamic approach to human
personality denounce punishment as an ineffective deterrent on the
grounds that anticipation of the consequences of his act is seldom part
of a criminal's consciousness at the time of committing a crime, particularly if it is an "impulsive" type of crime. Obviously, there are
many individuals whose personalities are so constituted that under
given sets of circumstances, they commit murder. But because they
were not consciously thinking of the electric chair or life imprisonment
just at the particular moment of committing the act does not mean that
their behavior was totally uauffected by the fact that they had learned
at some previous time what the eventual result would be should they
kill another human being, even though the effect was not great enough
to prevent the crime from occurring. Under a different, slightly less
provoking set of external circumstances, they might have been deterred.
Or another person with a slightly different pattern of personality characteristics might have been deterred under the given set of circumstances.
Although it does not always prevent a crime from being committed,
anticipation of punishment does have a deterring effect. Any given act
is a net result of a complex, dynamic interrelationship of innumerable
psychic factors, by no means all of which are accessable to the consciousness of the individual, even at any time. There is no more reason for
insisting that an individual must be conscious of a threatened punishment just at a particular moment in order for it to affect his overt
behavior at that moment than in insisting that a man must be "thinking
about" feelings of sexual inadequacy in order for them to be a relevant
factor in the motivation of such behavior as robbing a liquor store or
indulging in exhibitionism. The obvious fact that anticipated punishment is not always successful in deterring some persons from expressing
antisocial impulses under certain conditions by no means indicates that
it has no inhibiting effect upon the expression of such impulses by
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scores of other individuals who do not commit criminal acts, but who
might, were the threat of punishment not present.
Apropos of this and the second proposition offered above--4.e., that
one of the proper functions of the criminal law is the control of antisocial impulses and tendencies in the law-abiding, noncriminal members
of society-Ranyard West has the following comments:"'
It is in the realm of fundamental social attitudes that unconscious and conscious motivation may be most at variance. We may, if we wish to retain the
term, 2 call a man's "real wil" that "will" which determines his conduct.
But in so doing we must never forget how conduct often turns upon a hair,
and that the mass of man's "will" may be shot into the opposite side of the
scales by the sudden lighting up of a new apprehension or a new emotion.
The division of man's mind into conscious and unconscious is, throughout, a
pointer to the inconsistency, the instability, and the disharmony of that
human "will" which determines our conduct and upon which our civilization has been built. To this fact we have to give full recognition in building
our theory of law.
A balance must be set between man's social and his self-assertive
., ,
impulses. Someone must set that balance with the clear aim of expressing and
securing to the fullest degree possible man's physical, mental, and spiritual
needs.
Many an ideology will come with us as far as this. The aim of democratic law is that men shall set this balance for themselves. But not within
the prospect of a long future will men be capable of holding the balance of
their own (individual) emotional life. Because of the fact and the manifestations of aggressive impulses, others must execute for us the wishes of our
social selves-which we hold to be our major selves-in defiance of our
periodic outbursts of selfish and self-assertive impulses. Democratic law
provides us with the means to this end.
The prime operative duty of the law thus becomes the control of human
aggressiveness. It is upon the fact of the potential criminal in every man that
we may give to law its psychological grounding. All the fine regulations of
our business relationships, our contract and municipal law, all our national law
of today and our international law of tomorrow are and will be built up upon
that primary fact that mankind cannot control his own aggressive acquisitive-

ness unaided. Human aggressive acquisitiveness has been wrongly attributed
to a lack of conscientious morality in many men. We now know that some
of man's worst social behavior is compatible with the highest devotion to
31 West, I Psychological Theory of Law, in SAmE (ED.),
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 767, 775, 784-86 0947)"

" From Hegel.

INTERPRETATIONS OF
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moral standards; indeed-very few men are able to escape from their
devotion to whatever standards their consciences have acquired. The prime
fact about antisocial aggressiveness is its universal potential. The prime cause
of that aggressiveness is the inescapable general thwarting of selfish impulse
where it conflicts with social impulse. [I]t is hardly necessary to say that the
psychological theory of law here propounded accepts the criterion of "positive"
law, that it shall carry a sanction. Nay, more, we feel that in the psychology
of unconscious motivation we have the clue to the utter failure, as law, of
any "law" which does not carry a sanction, and in particular of "International
Law" as it is at present constituted ....
Law pursues and corrects aggressive
impulses. Upon the whole it will be found possible to separate those impulses
very largely from their temporary possessors, once we really try to do so.
Most men do evil things: few men wish *to do them once their evil passions
are removed and when the prejudices which gave rise to those passions are
allayed or explained. To those few whose antisocial conduct cannot be
separated from their major selves must be applied the standard of a "minimum altiuism, the plain man's plain duty." They must suffer accordingly.
But they will know, and we shall know, why they suffer; that their departure
from rectitude is a matter of degree, a disturbance of balance in their emotional development, perhaps to be corrected by psychoanalysis, certainly to be
dealt with kindly, though always with the full firmness of a society that knows
its requirements and its criteria of adequate social service.

It seems probable that many of the differences existing between
those who "disavow the basic premises about the penal law, viewing the
condemnatory-punitive aspect of criminal conviction as unjust and irrational,"33 and those who cling to a more traditional viewpoint may be
rooted in the fact that the former are less cognizant of that function of
criminal law which West considers here. If we could be concerned only
with the needs of persons who have broken the law and whom we wish
to rehabilitate (or deter from further crime in any other way), we
would be faced with a much less complex problem. However, since
the proper function of the criminal law includes the effective deterrence
of that large percentage of the population that does not commit criminal acts but has the potential for so doing, we must evaluate any
existing aspect of or proposed change in the law in light of the effect
that it has upon this function as well as its effects upon individuals who
have been charged with a crime. Wechsler says:34
"Wechsler,

The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, z2 U. Cmi. L. REV. 367, 375

(1955).
" Id. at 374.

(Emphasis added.)
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The purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social condemnation of
forbidden conduct, buttressed by sanctions calculated to prevent it-not alone
by incapacitating and so far as possible correcting the offending individual,
but also by their impact on the general imagination, i.e., through the medium
of general deterrence. Considerations of equality and of effectiveness conspire to demand that sanctions which are threatened generally be applied with
generality upon conviction-not that the sentence disregard differences in
circumstances or in individuals, but that the sentence be imposed within the
framework of such formal condemnation and conviction. Responsibility
criteria define a broad exception. The theory of the exception is that it is
futile thus to threaten and condemn persons who through no fault of their
own are wholly beyond the range of influence of threatened sanctions of
this kind. So long as there is any chance that the preventive influence may
operate, it is essential to maintain the threat. If it is not maintained, the
influence of the entire system is diminished upon those who have the requisite
capacity, albeit that they sometimes may offend.
On thi s analysis, the category of the irresponsible must be defined in
extreme terms: The problem is to differentiate between the wholly nondeterrable and persons who are more or less susceptible to influence by law.
The category must. be so extreme that to the ordinary man, burdened by
passion and beset by large temptations, the exculpation of the irresponsible
bespeaks no weakness of the law. He does not identify himself and them:
Beyond such extreme incapacities however, the
they are a world apart ....
exception cannot go. This, to be sure, is not poetic justice. It is public
justice, which in the interest of the common good prescribes a standard all
must subscribe to who can, those whose nature or nurture leads them to
conform with difficulty no less than those who find compliance easy.

It becomes apparent that a change which, considered superficially,
appears to be in the direction of increased rationality and scientific objectivity because it allows psychiatrists to give meaningful testimony
regarding an accused's mental state may actually be considered an
irrationalalteration in the law in that it may very well reduce rather
than increase the law's effectiveness by making the responsibility criteria
"realistic," thereby reducing the deterring effect of the law.
In considering the third and last proposition set forth above, let
us assume, for argument's sake, that determinism exists and that free
will is only imaginary, in spite of the strong conviction to the contrary
held by a majority of people who, because of the vividness of their subjective experiences of making choices and their psychological needs to
ascribe moral responsibility to others as well as to themselves, cling
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to a belief in the existence of free will as a last vestige of human dignity
in a mechanistic, impersonal universe in which rhyme and reason appear
less and less in evidence. Assume determinism to exist. What bearing
does this have on any meaningful effort to erect an effective system of
criminal law? It would appear, at least in so far as man is now constituted, that the success of any conceivable system of criminal law still
depends upon the ascription of individual moral responsibility to human
beings. Whether they are "really" responsible, whether they actually
do have a free moral choice to do good or evil, is a metaphysical question, and one which is not really relevant; for unless the law proceeds
upon the assumption that men are free moral agents who are responsible
for their behavior, it cannot be effective as a means of controlling human
conduct. To argue, as psychiatrists and other social scientists are often
wont to do, that the differentiation between "sane" persons who are
held responsible for their conduct, and the deranged who are not, is
being made by the courts on the basis of criteria that are outdated and
scientifically untenable is to quibble over details. The whole concept of
man that is the basis of our law is outdated and scientifically quite untenable! The M'Naghten Rules are singled out for attention simply
because they come to the fore in highly specific situations where law and
science dramatically dash, embodied in lawyer and psychiatrist. If the
law were really to attempt to be "scientific" in its approach, numerous
undesirable results would obtain. Arnold mentions a serious one when
he says:"
From any objective point of view the escape of the law from reality constitutes not its weakness but greatest strength ....
If judicial institutions become too sincere,' too self-analytical, they suffer the fate of ineffectiveness
which is the lot of all self-analytical people. . . . They lack that sincere
fanaticism out of which great government forces are welded.
Once it is dear that we are dealing with an institution that is, by
necessity, grounded in an unrealistic conceptualization of human characteristics, it seems rather picayune to argue that decisions defining the
line of demarcation between criminal responsibility and irresponsibility
must be based upon the more up-to-date and scientific knowledge that
is available to us today from the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology. Such decisions, if properly made, must ultimately rest only upon,
criteria that result from a serious consideration of what the effects upon
"ARNOLD,

THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 44. (1935).
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the law's efficacy will be, should the line of demarcation be drawn in
one place rather than another. Pseudo scientific rationalizations for
placing it here rather than there may be necessary, for ours is an age
that worships pseudo science as faithfully as it does science, but fortunately there has never been a dearth of requisite ability for this task among
members of the judiciary.
However, if this form of utilitarianism is to be our approach, what
role should psychiatry and the scientific conceptualization of human behavior play in an effective criminal law? Shall we simply turn our
backs on scientific knowledge, ignore reality, deny the existence of what
are well-established factors in the causation of criminal behavior? Such
an inference would be quite at variance with the major contention of
this paper, which is that we should effectively utilize what scientific
knowledge we have to gain the ends we desire, but that we cannot, in so
doing, ignore the relevance and importance of certain. realities of human
interaction, such as the obvious but often-neglected fact that a great
deal of man's social behavior is determined by what others expect of
him and what he believes to be true, rather than by what actually is
true. There is much that psychiatry has to offer that can be of extreme
value in reducing the crime rate, but the elimination of punitive elements in the criminal law and the widespread dissemination of the
notion that there is no such thing as moral responsibility or "bad"
behavior, but only "illness," are not, in the writer's estimation, part
of this valuable offering.
One of the most disturbing qualities of social science (which it
shares with physical science) is its delusion that it is utterly divorced
from the area of value judgments and ethical considerations. In the
minds of many of its protagonists, social science is conceived as being
concerned only with the determination of "truth"; with description, not
prescription; with the gradual development, through the utilization of
the scientific method, of a substantial body of laws describing the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The determination of the ends for which these scientific truths are to be utilized
is seldom, if ever; considered to be a scientific question, since it is one
that can only be answered by taking into account moral and ethical
considerations, which are not accepted as being within the realm of the
social scientist. Such an attitude can be a most convenient rationalization for denying any personal responsibility for one's influences on
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society. That a particular widely-held belief or attitude integral to the
effective functioning of an institution may be dissipated or destroyed by
a scientific discovery is not felt by the social scientist to be any of his
concerni his conscience is dear, for he is interested only in "truth," and
who dares level disapprobation at one pursuing this lofty ideal? The
fact of the matter is, however, that whether they are willing to accept
the responsibility or not, social scientists do have definite influences upon
matters of ethical concern. And what is more, they frequently exert
a deliberate influence, escaping to their fortress of scientific "objectivity"
only when they are challenged.
A succinct description of this attribute of scientists in general is made
in the following comment about psychology by Robert Redmount: 0
The sentient view that psychology takes of science is, in itself, a presentment of values. It stands as an affirmative condition of the psychological contribution that it expresses no personal bias toward its subject. The reality, criticism holds, is that this psychologist's view is delusive. It is merely a screen
through which psychofogy manipulates a human subject matter without accepting the consequences of its activity. It can see the social implications of some of
its findings-in fact, it may have intended them-but it denies that the
structure of many of its efforts is value-oriented. It too often refuses the
responsibility of relating the psychological contribution to the larger texture
of social knowledge and experience into which it sometimes deliberately
weaves itself.

. The relevance to the point under consideration seems clear. It
is not necessary to deny the existence or the importance of psychological
contributions, but only to feel the responsibility for relating them in the
most effective way to the "larger texture of social knowledge and experience." Hence, if we are effectively to utilize psychology's contributions
to improve the effectiveness of our criminal law, we must not only
determine what the relevant concepts are, but also ascertain in what ways
they can be most advantageously incorporated.
Perhaps psychology's most important single contribution has been
the demonstration of the existence of unconscious motivation and its
relationship to criminal acts. It would appear that the area in which
this concept can most effectively be applied is that involving the rehabilitation of some individuals, via psychotherapy, who have been
'aRedmount, A Pantoscopic View of Law and Psychology, io J. LEGAL ED. 436,
(Emphasis added.)
440 (1958).
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unable to conform to society's rules. It should be clear, even to the
person who is relatively unsophisticated in the area of psychology, that
unconscious forces are of considerable relevance in the motive patterns
of some criminals, but of minor consequence in other cases. Strangely
enough, however, a survey of the literature indicates that the seemingly
obvious point must be made that not all criminals are alike. The rather
peculiar thinking evidenced by some of the writers in the field of criminology,3 7 particularly those sociologists who follow Sutherland's
"differential association" theory, seems to lead them to the erroneous
assumption that because there exists a definable concept of "crime," "it"
must have a cause. Just a cursory consideration of the complexity of
the concept itself, not to mention even a superficial acquaintance with
the life histories of a few real criminals, shouldmake abundantly clear
that multiple causality is involved. To deny that multiple causality is
involved in producing criminal behavior makes so little sense that it
would seem that any approach to criminology that insists upon positing
a single cause of crime would have little chance of being taken seriously. Yet, there seems to be a strong tendency for sociologists to
attempt to formulate a single, comprehensive theory of the causation of
criminal behavior, and thereby to deny or at least to depreciate the extreme relevance of individual differences in personality, particularly
those differences that are related to unconscious processes.
While the "acting out" of unconscious conflicts is obviously not the
cause of crime any more than is anything else, it unquestionably plays an
important role in the causation of many illegal acts. Hence, if we wish
to reduce crime by turning the individuals involved into persons who
will be more apt to conform to the law's requirements, we must call
upon the vast body of knowledge and techniques that psychiatry and
clinical psychology have to offer. Unfortunately, truly definitive data
regarding the efficacy of psychotherapeutic techniques used as a means
of reducing recidivism are simply not available, but there are some
extremely encouraging indications that significant results can be obtained,
at least with some criminals.38 It must be emphasized, however, that
"See Cressey, The Differential Association Theory and Compulsive Crimes, 45 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 29 (1954); Glaser, The Sociological Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 683 (1958) ; Hartung, A Critique of the
Sociological Approach to Crime and- Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 703
(%958); Hartung, Methodological Assumption in a Social-Psychological Theory of
Criminality,
45 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 652 (x954).
8
" See Ross, Some Implications and Results of the Psychiatric Treatment of Inmates,
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it can be expected that psychotherapy will be effective only with some
criminals. Character neurotics (individuals whose repressed conflicts
are often resolved by "acting out" behavior that releases emotional
tensions, the cause of which is not within their conscious perceptions)
would be most benefited. Others, such as the senile psychotics, the
psychopaths, or the young hoodlums raised in dyssocial, slum environments where the very essence of the social atmosphere involves criminal values, are not as likely to respond to psychotherapeutic efforts.
Much of the controversy over the desirability of implementing
psychotherapeutic programs with convicted criminals hinges upon
whether or not those who could be helped constitute a large enough
proportion of the criminal population to make the effort worthwhile.
This is an extremely important question, but unfortunately, one to which
we can supply only the most tentative of answers. While a consensus of
sorts could be obtained on the ineffectiveness of psychotherapy for deteriorated organics and perhaps also for dyssocial personalities (in whose
case the major etiological factors seem often to involve the development
of a relatively normal constellation of personality characteristics within
a social environment laden with criminal values), there would be grave
differences of opinion among psychiatrists over the effectiveness of
therapy for psychopaths. This poses a problem, for some writers
estimate that ninety per cent of the criminal population is psychopathic;
however, others put the figure much lower; and still others deny both
the meaningfulness of the concept and the existence of such a "type."
There can be no question but that the term is a confusing one, nor
that the diagnostic category has been used as a. "waste basket" for all
kinds of odds and ends, with the result that there are several different
"kinds" of psychopath,3 9 as well as varying intensities of psychopathic
z J. FoR. SCI. 117 (1956).
At the time of publication of Ross's article, of oo
parolees treated in an outpatient clinic associated with the Medical Facility of the
California Department of Corrections, only 5 had had their paroles suspended, and
none of these had been convicted of having committed new crimes, after a year of
operation of the clinic. The present writer's own experiences with prisoners at the
California Medical Facility, and the demonstrable fact that the recidivism rate among
parolees from the Medical Facility is less than half that of parolees from other prisons,
cause him to feel that there are strong'potentialities for the effective use of group and
individual psychotherapy with a goodly proportion of convicted felons. It is too soon
to be certain that the activities of the California Medical Facility represent anything
other than a very effective selection system for choosing parolees, but the results obtained
thus far are encouraging rather than discouraging.
"' See Dunaif & Hoch, PseudopsychopathicSchizophrenia, in HOCH & ZUBIN, op. cit.
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disturbance. The degree to which it is believed possible to obtain therapeutic results with the psychopath is strictly a matter of opinion, and
part of the difference in views results from this confusion over what
actually constitutes a psychopath. The criteria utilized in defining the
concept appear to range from those which accept any antisocial behavior
as indicative of psychopathy to those based upon much more refined
evaluations of the relationship of superego functions to total personality.
The fact is that we just do not know very much about the various kinds
of personalities that we have labeled psychopaths, and we are similarly
in the dark about the extent to which psychotherapy can be of real use
in preventing individuals so classified from committing further crimes.
However, in spite of the fact that we cannot describe precisely the
personality syndromes that are represented in a prison population, it is
still possible to make some generalizations about the characteristics that
are in evidence. The extent to which the crimes committed by inmates
can be dearly seen to have been motivated by irrational, often unconscious, factors is impressive. The real reasons for committing the crime
are rarely those that the prisoner perceives to be relevant, and in many
cases, uncovering psychotherapy is of great help in aiding the individual
to understand his motives and thereby gain greater control over his
behavior. Another surprising aspect is that so many of the prisoners
are themselves aware of the irrationality of their own behavior, without
being able to understand what their motivations really were. Many, of
course, erect strong rationalizations and resist any suggestion that the
sensibleness of their behavior can be questioned. Others, however, are
quite upset by their perceptions of their own "unreasonableness."
A prisoner with a long and fairly "successful" criminal career once
said, "By God, if anybody- could tell me why I do what I do, I would
be willing to be called insane and go to a state institution to be studied,
or anywhere else." 0 In order to obtain psychotherapy, this "professional criminal" gave himself up, knowing that he would receive an extra
two years for parole violation. That he was unable to actually face
his conflicts and received little help after entering a psychoanalytical
supra note 17, at 169. The authors say that "(t)he term 'Psychopathic personality' has
a phenomenological meaning which perhaps covers different etiological mechanisms.
If one examines a number of people, conspicuous for their psychopathic behavior, three
groupings will be found: (i) the classic psychopath; (2) the acting-out neurotic; (3)
the acting-out schizophrenic." Id. at 169.
0
' ALEXANDER & HEALY, RooTs OF CRIME 13 (935).
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relationship points up the fact that psychotherapy is no panacea. But
this particular criminal was well aware of the irrationality of his conduct
and had a strong conscious desire to be helped in his efforts to control
his behavior. The writer contends that a significant proportion of the
prison population41 harbors similar desires (although they are seldom

so dramatically expressed) and furthermore, that in enough of these
cases to make its utilization a worthwhile endeavor, psychotherapy can

be of invaluable aid by bringing about a reorganization of personality so
that unconscious conflicts and impulses which have so greatly influenced
behavior are brought under more conscious control and thereby lose
their potency as motivating factors in the commission of antisocial acts.
When it is understood that this, and not the production of "happy,"

psychologically well-adjusted individuals is the proper goal of psychotherapy with inmates, the implementation of an effective therapy pro-

gram seems more feasible.
The criticism can easily be made that this contention is based
primarily upon faith, for there are no carefully controlled experimental
studies that demonstrate its truth. However, what meager systematic
evidence we do have supports it rather than detracts from it, and the

urgent need that exists for a more effective treatment of convicted
criminals demands that we explore to the utmost any approach that
" It is necessary to differentiate between criminals and inmates of penal institutions.
The latter comprise a more select group, for they are criminals who were caught.
There are numerous variables that influence this selection process, such as intelligence,
type of anti-social behavior indulged in, local attitudes, and laws, efficiency of the police
force, chance factors, and so on, but a variable that must also be given due consideration
is the amount of unconscious guilt harbored by the individual involved. It is not
surprising to find that the proportion of character neurotics found among inmates is
considerably higher than that estimated for the criminal population as a whole, for
those who are motivated to commit crimes because they are unconsciously seeking punUnless they
ishment are exactly the ones who are most apt to be apprehended.
"arrange things" so that they very likely will be caught, the real purpose of their act
is lost. (The writer is aware that the contention that some criminals want to be caught
and punished still seems extremely implausible to many people. What is truly farfetched, however, is the acceptance of any other explanation, once one obtains the full
set of facts accompanying many seemingly ridiculous and obviously stupid crimes committed by intelligent individuals.)
Hence, there is undoubtedly considerable validity to the claim that guilt-ridden
character neurotics (who are most likely to be helped by psychotherapy) are overrepresented in inmate populations. But since it is only the inmate population with whom
it is possible to deal, the fact that there are probably far greater proportions of psychopaths and dyssocial personalities in the criminal population at large seems hardly
relevant to any proposed plan for treating ccriminals," since we can, after all, treat
only inmates.
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holds promise of reducing the existing recidivism rate. If psychotherapy is completely impractical as a means of helping to deal with
the problem of reforming inmates, time and systematic research will
make this clear; but until such definite evidence is available, we should
expand the use of psychotherapy as a means of effectively treating a
significant proportion of our prison population.
It should be dear that this would not necessarily imply an abandonment of our basically punitive approach to dealing with criminals. The
reformers who advocate such a complete change, indulging as they do
in what Wechsler calls "... a kind of psychiatric crypto-ethics not uncommon in our culture, [holding that] anything that prefers commitment to conviction is desirable, 4 2 overlook the very real deterring effect
of punishment, especially the important influence threatened punishment has upon the great masses of individuals who are not criminals,
but are always potentially so. To be effective, the criminal law must
ascribe responsibility to all but the most obviously and extremely deviated, and it must contain sanctions involving some degree of punishment
for unlawful acts. However, if we wish to do everything possible to
prevent recidivism among convicted criminals, it is going to be necessary
to utilize the knowledge and techniques made available to us by depth
psychology and psychiatry. There can be little question but that until
alterations in their personalities are made through the use of uncovering psychotherapy, many criminals can never "adhere to the right," no
matter how much (nor how little) they are punished.
In order to clarify more fully the basis for the writer's contention
that the basic punitive approach of the law must be retained, let us turn
now to an appraisal of another suggestion that has frequently been
forwarded as a means of improving the effectiveness of the criminal law;
the suggestion that the sentencing function of the courts be placed in
the hands of a group of psychiatric experts. Again, the advocacy of
such an innovation is based upon a confusion of that which is more
scientific in technique with that which is more effective for gaining a
given end. It ignores the reality of the effects that 'such a change
would produce in the attitudes held by the majority of people, for
".... (t)he symbol of the wise and just father, punishing wrongdoers,
probably adds to the
stability of society and to the average individual's
'43
feeling of security.
"Wechsler, supra note 33, at 375.
4

3GUIrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 446 (95.).

Vol. 1961: 30]

PSYCHIATRY AND THE L4W

59

The idea of separating the "guilt-ascribing" function from the
sentencing function and leaving only the former in the hands of the
court is by no means new. Francis Wharton proposed the establishment
of a "disposition tribunal" some eighty years ago, and the suggestion has
been reiterated by numerous supporters, most of them psychiatrists of
criminologists, with increasing frequency during recent years. One great
advantage of such a plan, say its proponents, is that the matter over
which psychiatry and the law have most fundamentally and vociferously
clashed, the problem of determining legal insanity and irresponsibility,
would become an irrelevancy. Under such an approach, the concept of
legal insanity and the finding of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
would be totally unnecessary, and the endless and seemingly fruitless
combat over establishing acceptable criteria for them would cease. All
that the judge and jury would need to concern themselves with would
be establishing whether or not the accused did or did not commit the
crime with which he is charged; the determination of what to do with
him if found guilty would be made by a tribunal of experts qualified to
evaluate psychiatric and sociological data, thereby making the most
rational disposition of each case, regardless of the individual's "sanity."
It is assumed that the various dispositions available would include
hospitalization, probation, and the indeterminate incarceration of "incurables," as well as unconditional release, should that be deemed the
most rational approach to preventing recidivism in any particular case.
Under this approach, the concept of universal responsibility4 4
. .. is applicable if the concept is brought to a broader social therapeutic
meaning, a liability to comprehensive treatment provided by law. In this
frame of operation the unlawful act invokes a community sanction separate
from the guilt-finding ritual and at once disposes of the futile exercise of
calibrating responsibility to a chimerical scale of legal guilt. Universal responsibility lays open to the the law breaker, regardless of mental status, a
liability to a rational clinical manipulation which has within its resources imprisonment, hospitalization, probation, psychotherapy, and so on. Such a procedure would eliminate the defense of insanity in the guilt-finding process,
but not bar the introduction of scientific evidence into a separate procedure of
disposition.
There are numerous specific objections raised to such a plan, probably
the weakest of which is the assertion that the panel of experts would be
"'Roche, Criminal Responsibility, in HocH & ZUBIN, op. cit. supra note 17; at
107, 114.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. i96i: 30

inept; that they would not always make the proper decision because
psychiatry and psychology are not "exact" sciences. No doubt errors
would occur under such a plan, but there is little doubt but that there
could be a much more rational disposition of individual cases than occurs
under the existing state of affairs, wherein judges with little or no
understanding of either sociology or personality dynamics daily make
decisions in which sentences are set or suspended and individuals are incarcerated or placed on probation on the basis of idiosyncratic and often
quite ridiculous criteria.
The fear of too much power falling into the hands of psychiatrists
is also often voiced. Plans for a disposition tribunal most often include
the possibility for a completely indeterminate sentence, making it
theoretically possible for an offender to be sentenced to life imprisonment for stealing a car, should the experts decide that his personality
pattern was such that there existed little chance that he could be reformed. The objection is usually leveled not so much at the "injustice"
of a given criminal being so treated as the granting of this amount of
authority to a group of "experts" who can agree no better on basic
questions of diagnosis than psychiatrists do.
The few attempts that have been made to put such an approach into
practice in the United States have all run afoul of constitutional objections. At various times, Washington, Louisiana, and Mississippi
have enacted laws under which the sentencing power has been delegated
to a panel of experts. 4 5 In each case, the law was repealed because it
was held to violate "due process," the basic argument being that
responsibility is an inherent part of guilt, and a jury cannot evaluate
an accused's guilt without evaluating his responsibility as well; hence,
it must be a jury that decides whether an accused is responsible or not.
This means that it must be the jury that really makes gross disposition
of his case, since the decision on the matter of responsibility determines
whether the accused should be sent to a mental hospital or to prison.
There is some validity to all of these criticisms, but in the writer's
opinion, none of them brings out the major shortcoming of the disposition tribunal, which is that such an approach would tend to reduce
4a Washington: REM. & BAL. CODE § 2259 (19o9), declared unconstitutional in State
v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. xo6, zio Pac.

1o2o (ig9o).
Louisiana: LA. CODE CPIM. PROC.
arts. 268-73 (1928), declared unconstitutional in State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So.
639 (1929). Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN., §§ 1327, 1328 (1930), declared unconstitutional in Sinclair v. State, x61 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (193).
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the deterring effect of the criminal law by breaking down the widelyheld concepts of personal responsibility and immutability of punishment
for wrongdoing. It has been contended here that in our society, general
acceptance of free will and personal responsibility for conduct is a
necessity in order that we may live together in a civilized fashion. It
has been further asserted that anticipation of punishment for wrongdoing
has a definite deterring effect upon the vast majority of our citizens, in
spite of the fact that it does not deter all of them from committing

crimes. There does exist among us a widely and deeply-held belief that
"justice" requires a law breaker to suffer, and that this has nothing whatsoever to do with pragmatic considerations. In other words, we tend
to believe that the proper function of punishment is retributive rather
than utilitarian, and to the extent that we have it demonstrated to us

that the law is, in actuality, utilizing punishment in only a utilitarian
fashion, to that extent our belief in "justice" and the meaningfulness of
our concepts of.free will and personal responsibility will be shaken.
While it may be true that the scientific view of man upon which psychiatry is based provides ample evidence that these latter concepts are highly
erroneous, they are no less a necessary part of our belief system if our
society is to function effectively. To establish a disposition tribunal of
the type described would, the writer fears, accomplish less good than
harm; for while it could allow for a more rational treatment of convicted criminals, it would seriously challenge many beliefs that are of
crucial importance for the effective functioning of the criminal law.
Were such an approach to be effected, the elimination of the insanity plea would imply that everyone was being held equally irresponsible; for to maintain that the law would be holding everyone
equally responsible by considering them "liable to a rational clinical
manipulation," as Roche puts it, is but one rather peculiar interpretation.
A more probable one, as far as the general public is concerned, would
be that all criminals were being considered equally irresponsible, in that,
sane or insane, they would all be turned over to a group of psychiatric
experts for treatment. Even if a disposition tribunal should decide
that a particular criminal should be subjected to severe and prolonged
punishment, this would still be perceived as a treatment that had been
prescribed as a means of curing a sick individual, rather than a just
retribution for a crime committed as a free act of evil intent. There
is considerable difference in the effects produced upon the public when

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. t961: 30

the functioning of the criminal law is perceived in the one way rather
than the other. Guttmacher and Weihofen have asked :46
Fundamentally, why should it make any difference whether a person who has
committed a criminal act was sane at the time and therefore guilty, or "not
guilty by reason of insanity"? In either case he has shown himself a menace
to society who must be taken into custody and control. Why worry over
whether that control is based on criminality or insanity?
The basis of the answer to their questions would seem to be the fact
that our concept of guilt has inherent in it the concept of responsibility
for one's acts, and it is of importance to determine whether the individual in question was or was not a free moral agent capable of controlling his behaviori for however erroneous belief in this concept
of free choice may be, it is a concept that must be retained if we are to
be maximally influenced by moral and ethical considerations. To maintain that it makes no difference whether we incarcerate a man for a
criminal act or commit him to an institution as a sick individual is to
overlook the extremely important effects that such a straightforward
utilitarian philosophy would have upon the population as a whole.
Perhaps for the psychiatrist, "C... the individual's social dangerousness

and not his moral blameworthiness is the essential criterion in administering the criminal law,"4 but this is by no means true for the majority
of people. For them, the moral blameworthiness of the accused person
is a factor of extreme relevance.
It is not necessary, however, to resort to the argument that the
function of punishment should be conceived as retributive rather than
utilitarian simply because that is the way in which the majority of people
think of it, for there is "another fallacy in the reasoning underlying the
view that punishment should be utilized in a utilitarian way in order to
be most effective. The avowed basis for this latter position is the
assertion that in order to be effective, man must apply the same objective
and scientific method to the study of himself that he has used in mastering the physical environment. Human behavior will then be conceived
as a dependent variable, the form of which is determined solely by
antecedent conditions. It is possible to concede this point and still deny
the meaningfulness of an approach that maintains that there is no value
in supporting the concept of personal responsibility, for such an ap8

' GUrr-MACHER & WEIHOFEN, Op. Ci. supra note 43, at 443.
T

' Id. at 444-
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proach artificially excludes certain highly relevant antecedent conditions
from their role as determining factors.
It is true, and properly so, that no one today would hold a tree
('responsible" for being undersized and bearing inferior fruit. In
order to deal most effectively with the problems involved in producing
trees that manifest the characteristics we desire, we must maintain a
completely objective attitude toward the trees; in fact, we must refrain
from picturing them as moral agents at all. To blame a tree or praise
it, or to blame hostile gods or demons for its performance, is irrelevant
and childish behavior that is without effect, we have discovered, for
the performance of the tree is completely determined by such antecedent
conditions as the amount of fertilizer and water used, the presence or
absence of noxious elements in the soil, etc. Since the tree can do
nothing but respond to the physical influences that act upon it, we must
concern ourselves only with these relevant determining influences if we
wish to alter its performance.
Some of those who desire to see the scientific method brought to
bear to help solve the problem of criminality have concluded that we
must adopt the same attitude toward the criminal that we have adopted
toward the tree--i.e., we must not ascribe blame to him, nor hold him
responsible for his actions, but must recognize instead that he, like
everything else in the universe, is merely responding to the influence
of the forces which act upon him. If he behaves in a criminal manner,
it is because he has been influenced by certain antecedent determining
factors, and the proper endeavor is to attempt to undo their effects
through a treatment approach, not to blame the individual for "behaving badly."
The fallacy in this argument is that this attitude toward criminal
acts, if widely held in a society, could itself function as one of the
relevant antecedent conditions tending to produce criminal behavior.
Trees, gods, and demons are not sensitive to human praise or disapprobation; human beings are. In other words, blaming human beings
for their acts is quite different from blaming trees, simply because a
tree is so constructed that "blame" short of physical damage cannot
have any stimulus function whatever, while the human organism, though
equally subject to antecedent conditions as the sole determinants of its
performance, is so constructed that the attitudes held toward it by
members of its own species during its development constitute a type
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of relevant antecedent condition. To give official support to the idea
that we are all equally responsible because no one is really responsible
would be to produce a detrimental effect upon the behavior of a significant percentage of the population-individuals whose particular
constellations of conflicts, values, and needs are such that they possess
a predisposition toward antisocial acts, but are inhibited from committing
them by a belief in their own personal responsibility for their actions and
by their anticipation of justly meted punishment. That there exist some
who are well-adjusted enough to rerhain unaffected to any significant
degree by such a realistic appraisal of man may be true; that there are
some whose personality patterns are such that they behave in a criminal
manner in spite of the fact that they are aware that they will be held
accountable is manifestly demonstrable. However, a large percentage
of the population lies somewhere between these two extremes, and it
is with this potentially antisocial element that we must be concerned if
we are most significantly to appraise the effects of a shift toward a "treatment" approach to criminality.
There is still another not unrelated danger inherent in any plan
to remove the ultimate criteria for social control from their roots in
the beliefs and values of a given social group. Waelder states this
problem succinctly when he says:4"
[T] he complete elimination of the concept of retribution from the legal
system may not be without danger. It would tend to dissociate the law
entirely from moral sentiment. If the law no longer must conform, by and
large, to moral standards, utilitarianism or expediency becomes its only guide.
The emancipation from traditional moral sentiments, begun at first for humanitarian purposes, may eventually have consequences not so humanitarian.
Once everything can be done that appears to be socially useful, i.e., that is so
considered by those who have authority to define social usefulness, a course
has been charted that may well end in despotism. Liberal positivism, in its
humanitarian distaste for the harsher aspects of traditional morality, may, by
undermining the authority of traditional morality, become the pathbreaker of
more ruthless successors. The humanitarian goal with which I am in full
sympathy seems to me to be better served by the progressive mitigation of
the severity of retribution rather than by an attempt to eliminate the retributive
aspect altogether.
"4Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility,
REV. 378, 387 (.952).
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His last sentence suggests an important but infrequently appreciated
differentiation that should be made. Such evidence as there is that
shows that severe punishment is ineffective as a means of controlling the
criminal behavior of some individuals might perhaps call for a reduction
in the severity of punishment, but not the complete removal of the
retributive aspect of the criminal law. To insist that mild punishment,
carefully utilized, may accomplish as much as severe punishrfient may be
a defensible position, but it is highly doubtful that the desired ends
of the criminal law can be attained through the use of an approach from
which the retributive (and hence the punitive) aspects have been eliminated. It is for this reason that the disposition tribunal must be rejected, even though it may very well be true that more rational dispositions of individual cases would be possible under such an approach.
Similar grounds exist for rejecting the Durham Rule. For the
very reason that the Durham Rule is more rational and does allow for
meaningful psychiatric testimony to be given, it must be rejected as a
means for determining "insanity" and "irresponsibility." It allows for
the direct introduction of psychiatric reality. into the courtroom, a state
of affairs that is quite undesirable for the effective functioning of the
criminal law. We must believe in personal responsibility and free will
if the law is to functioni all that is required of the law is that it allow
us to be consistent with our beliefs by not punishing persons who are
so extremely and obviously deranged that they are dearly not capable
of exercising their free will. What is required is some specified criteria
for establishing the degree of derangement that is to be considered
obvious and extreme. The Durham Rule, rather than providing this,
allows for testimony to be introduced that tends to break down our whole
conceptualization by repeatedly pointing up the fact, if anyone cares
to take its implications seriously, that no line of demarcation can really
be drawn, and that everyone actually is equally irresponsible, regardless
of the practical demands for responsible behavior that the psychiatrists
may have agreed to accept among themselves.
Should we, then, retain the M'Naghten Rules, falling back upon the
familiar rationalization that "no better criteria can be established"?
This, too, seems an unacceptable alternative, in light of the severe and
widespread dissatisfaction with them that exists. The basic cause of
this discontent is that the M'Naghten Rules represent just a bit too
irrational an approach to the problem of criminal irresponsibility, for

66

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19 61:30

they make it so obvious that reality is being distorted that we become
uneasy. Fortunately, there exists a means of determining irresponsibility that appears rational enough to be respectable and at the same
time, gives a legal definition to insanity, thereby preventing the undesirable introduction of psychiatric reality into the courtroom. The
means referred to is the proposal of the American Law Institute contained in the Model Penal Code, a proposal seconded, as it were, by the
New York Governor's Conference on the Defense of Insanity. According to this proposal:

49

(i) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity, either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2)
The terms "mental disease or defect" d&" not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
Such a formulation is more realistic than the M'Naghten Rules, in
that it does not limit the criteria to "knowledge" of right and wrong or
the nature and quality of an act, but speaks of a "capacity" to appreciate
the criminality of an act, or to do what is required by the law. Some
of the major objections to the M'Naghten Rules-i.e., that they overemphasize the importance of cognitive functions, that they do not clarify
what is meant by "wrongness," and that they do not allow for the
existence of "irresistible impulses"--are thus met. That there exists a
strong probability of future disagreement over the meaning of "capacity"
and "substantial" cannot be denied, but this is beside the major point,
which is that under the Model Penal Code, the determination of who
is and who is not responsible is a function that would be left in the
hands of the law. The interpretations given to the words "substantial
capacity" might vary, but the common interpretations would contain an
expression of the prevailing sentiments in the society, which would mean
that none but the "obviously" mentally deviant individuals would be
excused from responsibility. That this is the intention of the formulators of the Code would seem to be indicated by part (2), which is
an obvious attempt to keep individuals who are not "crazy" (e.g., psychopaths) from escaping responsibility for their criminal acts. Thus, we
have in the Model Penal Code an approach that will accomplish essentially what the M'Naghten Rules accomplish, the excusing from criminal
J"MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 195).
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responsibility of a small percentage of extremely deviant individuals
whose condemnation and punishment would prove disturbing to us
because they are manifestly not the same as the rest of us. The major
difference is that the Model Penal Code appears to be more in harmony with current knowledge concerning cognition and conation and
their relationships to overt behavior, thus satisfying our need for an
approach that is not so anachronistic as that based upon the MNaghten
Rules.
The real value of the Model Penal Code's formulation, however, is
that the acquiescence to the demands of psychiatric reality is limited to a
merely semantic reformulation of the criteria to be utilized in establishing responsibility; it remains firmly based in the assumption that
the vast majority of individuals are to be held responsible, while only
the few who can be demonstrated to a jury's satisfaction to be lacking in
"substantial capacity" will be held to be irresponsible. It is a jury of
one's peers who will, ultimately, decide whether there is present the
requisite "substantial capacity," thereby avoiding the real danger involved in taking the findings of psychiatry into serious considerationi.e., the danger of admitting the relevance of the mental abnormality
that is present in a very large number of crimes and the absence of the
capacity to have acted otherwise that is present in all crimes.
Returning, by way of conclusion, to the case presented at the beginning of this paper, it will be remembered that there appeared to have
been an injustice committed in the attempt to utilize a nonpunitive
approach within the existing framework of our legal system. It certainly cannot be denied that the inmate's sentence of one year to life in
the state prison system must have seemed grossly unfair to him, but
it should be clear that the judge's disposition was consistent with the
position taken in this paper. The administration of the criminal law
does involve more than merely making certain that the apprehended
criminal will never again commit an illegal act. It is the inability of
the advocates of a completely nonpunitive approach to realize this basic
fact that creates so much of their misunderstanding of what the law
must demand. From the standpoint of the inmate under consideration,
being sent to prison after being "cured" was a great personal inconvenience, to put it mildly, and unjust because in so far as his particular
needs were concerned, it was totally unnecessary and seemed to serve
only the blind needs for revenge extant in the criminal law. But if the
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judge's decision was to be based upon a cognizance of the total function
of the law, he had no choice but to deny probation. The law's deterring
effect upon potential offenders (a function that definitely exists, despite
the limited perception of many reformers) would have been diminished
by releasing an offender from punitive action simply because he was no
longer "sick." That the real effect of this single case would have been
minute is beside the point.
Critics of the above position are frequently wont to distort an aspect
of the situation. There is implicit in their arguments the assumption
that by exposing to punitive action a man like the inmate we have
considered, we will "undo" all of the good that has been done by
psychotherapy. This is simply untrue. There can be no question but
that differentiations can be made among prison environments as to the
degree to which they are conducive to effective psychotherapy, but this
does not mean that the consequences of a successful psychotherapy can
be undone or prevented simply by placing the individual in a prison
environment, provided that there is no extreme brutality or injustice in
the treatment of the prisoners and that there is proper emphasis given
to the function of psychiatric services. Being incarcerated may cause
him to experience frustration, but if the psychotherapy has been successful, the inmate should have new means for coping with frustration.
Indeed, incarceration may be considered a worthwhile test of an individual's capacity to deal with one kind of stress-producing situation. If
certain requirements of organization and underlying philosophy are met,
there is nothing at all inconsistent about utilizing psychotherapy in
conjunction with reasonable punitive action, either in the way exemplified by the case we have considered here or within the prison itself.
Two different but equally necessary ends are being served by the two
processes, and once this is understood, the seemingly paradoxical aspect
involved in combining them is seen to be more apparent than real.
Unquestionably, there will occur under any such approach many
instances in which individuals feel that they have been treated unfairly,
but we can only be concerned with the extent to which this feeling is apt
to increase the probability of recidivism, and not with the inmates' feelings per se. Unless there is adequate evidence that such resentment will
undo whatever positive effects psychotherapy has had, there can be no
real ground for concern, for the very simple reason that the crime problem has reached such proportions in the United States today that it has
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become mandatory that we express our major concern over that which is
required for a more effectively functioning society, rather than that
which works for the maximum personal satisfaction of individuals found
guilty of committing crimes. Whenever a legal institution can function
in such a manner that both values can be realized, it is all to the good,
since punishment is not an end in itself. But when there exists a conflict between these two values, we must dearly understand that if we
are really serious in our assertions that we desire to reduce the crime
rate, we must accept the simple and seemingly obvious proposition that,
in this area, the needs of society are of greater importance than the
immediate needs of individuals who break the law.
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